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THE FIRST AMENDMENT-AN ABSOLUTE RIGHT?
KATHLEEN A. BUCK*
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the United States Constitution all branches of govern-
ment play a role in protecting our most vital national defense in-
formation. Balanced against this need is the first amendment and
the responsibility to inform the public. In his paper on the access
to classified information, Bruce Fein explores the tensions inherent
in our system of checks and balances to accomodate these needs.
Within this system of checks and balances, each branch of govern-
ment plays a special role in relation to national security
information.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE TO PROTECT THE NATIONAL
SECURITY
Article II, section one of the Constitution provides "[t]he execu-
tive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America."1 Section two of that Article states "[tihe President shall
be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the Navy of the United
States" and "[h]e shall have Power, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the
Senators present concur .... ,,2 As the Commander-in-Chief it is
the President's responsibility to maintain our national security and
protect the nation from foreign aggression.
The 1875 case of Totten v. United States3 gives historical in-
sight regarding the Supreme Court's early view of the national se-
curity authority of the President. In Totten, a suit was appealed to
the Supreme Court from the Court of Claims for compensation for
services performed pursuant to a contract with President Lincoln.
*Assistant General Counsel (Office of Legal Counsel), Department of Defense. B.A. 1970
St. Mary's College; J.D. 1973, Indiana University.
1. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
2. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
3. 92 U.S. 105 (1875).
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Under the contract, Mr. Totten collected intelligence information
concerning troops in the South. The Supreme Court had no diffi-
culty recognizing the President's authority to engage in such activi-
ties. The Supreme Court stated that "[h]e was undoubtedly au-
thorized during the war, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of
the United States, to employ secret agents to enter the rebel lines,
and obtain information respecting the strength, resources, and
movements of the enemy.' '4 Executive decisions in the national se-
curity area are almost by definition contingent upon executive dis-
cretion.5 Certainly, the flexibility the Constitution affords our pub-
lic officials in meeting the demands of government in situations of
war as well as peace is one of the reasons our Constitution has
served us so well.
III. THERE IS NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF SPECIAL ACCESS TO
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
A. Media Access is not a Special Right
As indicated by Mr. Fein, government interests may at times be
fostered by secrecy. For example, disclosure of classified informa-
tion may undermine the fighting capability of our armed forces
and may actually risk the lives of the people involved in a military
operation. By necessity there can be no absolute constitutional
right to access to combat information. A field commander must be
in a position of discretion to protect the lives of his troops.
In 1983 this issue arose when armed forces conducted a rescue
mission in Grenada. On October 26, 1983, the day after the United
States initiated a rescue mission of American civilians in Grenada,
a suit was brought by publishers Larry Flynt and LFR Inc., to en-
join the Secretaries of Defense and State from "preventing or oth-
erwise hindering" plaintiffs from sending reporters to Grenada to
gather news. For operational security reasons Grenada was closed
to private aircraft and ships. 7 The plaintiff's claims were based on
the first amendment.8
4. See id. at 106.
5. See Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
6. Flynt v. Weinberger, 588 F. Supp. 57 (D.D.C. 1984).
7. Id. (declaration of Colonel Charles McClain).
8. Id. (paragraphs 5 and 12 of the plaintiffs' complaint).
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The commander of the military operation could not guarantee
the safety of reporters during the first stages of the operation.
Moreover, a critical element of the operation was "surprise." 9 By
the morning of the rescue mission, approximately five hundred
members of the press had congregated on the Island of Barbados,
trying to enter Grenada. Logistically, accomodating five hundred
members of the press in any operation would be difficult. Within
forty eight hours the press was accomodated.
On October 27 the commander in charge of the operation deter-
mined that a pool of reporters could be flown in safely. Appropri-
ate arrangements were made and fifteen members of the news me-
dia were transported from Barbados to Grenada.10 The next day
plaintiffs withdrew their motions for a temporary restraining order
and a preliminary injunction. By October 30, 1983 any reporter
was allowed to go in on military aircraft. Ninety seats on each of
the three C-130 aircraft were dedicated to the press."
In response to defendants' motion to dismiss, the court in Flynt
found that the plaintiffs' claims for relief were moot. 12 Further, the
court declined to enter an injunction restraining the government
from restricting press access to future United States military oper-
ations.'" Finally, the district court found that the plaintiffs' claims
for a declaratory judgment were moot.' 4 The court stated that
"where the decision being scrutinized is committed to the broad
discretion of the commander in the field and is contingent upon a
wide range of factors determinable only with reference to the par-
ticular military operation being undertaken, a declaratory judg-
ment would be useless."' 5
Although the district court in Flynt did not address the merits,
no constitutional basis existed for the claim that members of the
press have a right of access to military combat zones. A number of
9. See supra note 7.
10. 588 F. Supp. at 58.
11. See supra note 7.
12. See supra note 8.
13. 588 F. Supp. at 61.
14. Id. The lack of jurisdiction to review moot cases is based on article I of the Consti-
tution. The exercise of judicial power depends upon the existence of a case or controversy.
SEC v. Medical Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403, 407 (1972); Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784, 788 (1969).
15. 588 F. Supp. at 61.
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Supreme Court cases support the argument that the news media
have no right of access under the first amendment superior to
other members of the public. Zemel v. Rusk 16 is a landmark case in
this area. In Zemel, the Secretary of State refused to validate a
passport for travel to Cuba. The Court stated:
[W]e cannot accept the contention of appellant that it is a First
Amendment right which is involved. For to the extent that the
Secretary's refusal to validate passports for Cuba acts as an in-
hibition (and it would be unrealistic to assume that it does not),
it is an inhibition of action .... The right to speak and publish
does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather
information. 17
The Supreme Court again addressed this issue in Branzburg v.
Hayes.'8 The question before the Court was whether requiring
newsmen to testify before a grand jury would abridge the freedoms
of speech and press guaranteed by the first amendment. The Court
concluded that the requirement did not. 9 The newsman argued
that if a reporter had to reveal his confidences, the source identi-
fied and other sources would be deterred from furnishing informa-
tion. The Court distinguished this case from one involving prior
restraint, which would pose significant first amendment considera-
tions.20 The Court focused on the question of access to information
and the constitutional considerations involved in such access:
It has generally been held that the First Amendment does not
guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to in-
formation not available to the public generally. ...
Despite the fact that newsgathering may be hampered, the
press is regularly excluded from grand jury proceedings, our own
conferences, the meetings of other official bodies gathered in ex-
ecutive session, and the meetings of private organizations. News-
men have no constitutional right of access to the scenes of crime
or disaster when the general public is excluded....
16. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
17. Id. at 16-17.
18. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
19. Id. at 667.
20. Id. at 681.
21. Id. at 684-85.
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In 1978 the press challenged a restriction on access to a county
jail, seeking to gain information concerning prison conditions. In
Houchins v. KQED, Inc.22 a broadcasting company claimed that
denial of access to a jail violated the first amendment. The Su-
preme Court refused to recognize any special right of access to
gather news: "[n]either the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth
Amendment mandates a right of access to government information
or sources of information within the government's control"2 3
A similar case was brought before the Supreme Court in 1974 by
four California prison inmates and three professional journalists.
In Pell v. Procunier,24 the plaintiffs challenged the constitutional-
ity of a regulation that provided that "[p]ress and other media in-
terviews with specific individual inmates will not be permitted. '25
The media plaintiffs asserted that this limitation on their news-
gathering activity unconstitutionally infringed the freedom of the
press guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments.
The Court balanced the prisoner's first amendment claims
against the legitimate policies and goals of the corrections sys-
tem.26 In addition, the Court weighed heavily the fact that inmates
had an unrestricted opportunity to communicate with the press
through visitors and writings.27
Members of the press argued that they had a constitutional right
to interview and relied on their right to gather news without gov-
ernment interference. Moreover, they argued that no substantial
government interest could be shown to justify the denial of access
to individual inmates. 28 The Court did not agree, however, that
face to face interviews constituted a superior method of news-
gathering or that its curtailment amounted to an unconstitutional
government interference.29 In Pell, the Court concluded that the
Constitution does not impose upon government the affirmative
duty to make available to journalists sources of information not
22. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
23. Id. at 15.
24. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
25. Id. at 819.
26. Id. at 821.
27. Id. at 826.
28. Id. at 833.
29. Id.
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available to the general public.30
In a companion case to Pell, Saxbe v. The Washington Post,31
the Post challenged the Policy Statement of the Federal Bureau of
Prisons prohibiting personal interviews between newsmen and in-
mates. Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, found this case con-
stitutionally indistinguishable from Pell,32 and endorsed the rea-
soning of the Court in Pell.
In sum, Chief Justice Warren's comments in Zemel v. Rusk'3 re-
flect the reasoning consistently adopted by the Supreme Court:
[t]here are few restrictions on action which could not be clothed
by ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow. For
example, the prohibition of unauthorized entry into the White
House diminishes the citizen's opportunities to gather informa-
tion he might find relevant to his opinion of the way the country
is being run, but that does not make entry into the White House
a First Amendment right. The right to speak and publish does
not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information.34
B. Due Deference and the State Secrets Privilege
As noted by Mr. Fein, the Government may lodge a formal claim
of privilege in a civil action to block access to documents. This
privilege basically stops the production of documents instead of
blocking the right of access to areas, buildings, and people. The
state secrets privilege is rarely used by the government and re-
quires the Secretary of the blocking agency to file a personal affi-
davit. The affidavit is submitted to the court for the purpose of
asserting a formal claim of privilege to protect certain state secrets
relating to the national defense and security. While agencies strive
to file an affidavit on the public record, the sensitivity of the infor-
mation may necessitate the filing of an affidavit in camera to dis-
close specific details to the court. The affidavits filed generally re-
view the nature of the documents and analyze the security
considerations that mandate nondisclosure.
30. Id. at 834.
31. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
32. Id. at 851.
33. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
34. Id. at 16-17.
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The landmark case regarding the state secrets privilege is
United States v. Reynolds.3 5 In Reynolds, the Supreme Court
found that a formal claim of privilege would prevail if the trial
court was satisfied that military secrets were at stake." Arguably, a
protective order would provide sufficient security to protect docu-
ments that are produced. A protective order might prevent docu-
ments from falling into improper hands. A protective order, how-
ever, might not carry out its functions. In another important case,
Halkin v. Helms, 37 the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia noted that protective orders cannot prevent in-
advertent disclosure nor reduce the damage which may result from
such inadvertent disclosure.3 s In Halkin, the plaintiffs alleged that
the defendants, specifically the National Security Agency, violated
their constitutional rights by conducting warrantless interceptions
of their international wire, cable, and telephone communications."
The issue before the court was whether the National Security
Agency should be ordered to disclose if this had occurred. ° In par-
ticular, the plaintiffs attacked the court's consideration of three in
camera affidavits and in camera testimony.41 The court found that
in camera proceedings are an appropriate means to settle disputed
issues of privilege.42
The court in Halkin stressed that the state secrets privilege is
absolute, and that the need for well-informed advocacy must give
way to the government's privilege against disclosure of its secrets
of state.43 The court added that the standard of review in consider-
ing the privilege was a narrow one and that courts should accord
the "utmost deference" to executive assertions of the state secrets
privilege.44 As a rule, this tool has been exercised cautiously by the
35. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
36. Id. at 9-10.
37. 598 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
38. Id. at 7.
39. Id. at 3.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 5.
42. Id. (citing Kerr v. United States District Court, 426 U.S. 394, 405-06 (1976); United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 714-15 (1974); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10
(1953)).
43. 598 F.2d at 7.
44. Id. at 9.
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Executive to protect only the Nation's most sensitive information.
IV. THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS IS NOT ABSOLUTE
An employee of the government who accepts the privilege of ac-
cess to classified information also accepts the restraints which ac-
company this privilege. The Central Intelligence Agency, the State
Department, and the Defense Department generally require em-
ployees with access to classified information to sign a secrecy
agreement. Once the employee leaves the government, challenges
to the continuing effect of such an agreement have been presented
in terms of first amendment guarantees.
In the case of United States v. Marchetti,45 a former CIA em-
ployee wrote a book containing information acquired during the
period he was an employee. The CIA brought suit to enjoin the
employee from publishing the book without approval by the CIA.
The injunction was granted. Mr. Marchetti then sued when the
CIA concluded that some items could not be published because
they were properly classified. In Marchetti the question was
whether the first amendment invalidated a secrecy agreement
which required prepublication review of any writing. The court
found the agreement constitutional, reasonable and lawful.48
Although the court found that judicial review of any action by
the CIA disapproving publication of material was essential, the
court added that the burden of obtaining judicial review did not
rest on the government.47 In most cases no practical reason exists
for judicial review because classification is part of the executive
function beyond the scope of judicial review.48 The court stated:
There is a practical reason for avoidance of judicial review of
secrecy classifications. The significance of one item of informa-
tion may frequently depend upon knowledge of many other
items of information. What may seem trivial to the uninformed,
may appear of great moment to one who has a broad view of the
scene and may put the questioned item of information in its
45. 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
46. Id. at 1318.
47. Id. at 1317.
48. Id.
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proper context.49
While the motives of the former employee may be laudable, that
employee is not necessarily in a position to assess the damage
caused by publication. The court thus rejected first amendment
claims and focused on the fact that the employee knowingly en-
tered the employment agreement and accepted the trust imposed
on the employee by virtue of his employment.
In a sequel to the Marchetti case, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v.
Colby,5 ° plaintiffs sought an order permitting the publication of
certain items of classified information. In this case, Marchetti had
collaborated with John Marks, a former employee of the State De-
partment, who also was bound not to publish classified informa-
tion.51 After the government reviewed the manuscript, a number of
items were classified and could not be published. 2 The court
stated that the deleted items could be withheld only if they were
found to be classified and classifiable under the Executive Order. 3
In other words, the court would review whether appropriate proce-
dures had been followed to classify the information and whether
the information met the standards of the Executive Order.
The court recognized that the expertise within the Executive is
important in such determinations and the court should presume
that a public official who classified the information properly dis-
charged his official duties." The court refused to modify the previ-
ous ruling that the first amendment is no bar to an injunction for-
bidding the disclosure of classified information when:
(1) the classified information was acquired during the course of
his employment, by an employee of the United States agency or
department in which such information is handled and (2) its dis-
closure would violate a solemn agreement by the employee at
the commencement of his employment. With respect to such in-
formation, by his execution of the secrecy agreement and his en-
try into the confidential employment relationship, he effectively
49. Id. at 1318.
50. 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975).
51. Id. at 1365.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1367.
54. Id. at 1368.
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relinquished his First Amendment rights.5
The court placed great emphasis on this confidential relationship
that ought not to be abused. The public trust requires that a
"leaker" not be permitted to violate that trust by leaking informa-
tion to the public, and then claiming that the information is in the
public domain and therefore cannot be classified. Further, to per-
mit this to occur would complicate the analysis which may be done
of what is or is not actually in the public domain. The publication
of information by an official or former official in a position to know
may confirm the veracity of information as compared to any writer
who may speculate on foreign affairs or defense matters.
Another important case dealing with these issues is United
States v. Snepp." Snepp, a former CIA employee, published his
book without approval or even submission to the CIA.5 7 The Su-
preme Court upheld the imposition of a constructive trust which
required Snepp to pay over any profits from the book to the gov-
ernment .5 The Supreme Court found a compelling government in-
terest in protecting the secrecy of national security information,
and that the agreement in question was a reasonable means of pro-
tecting the Nation's secrets. 59 The Court carefully examined the
vital interests at stake and affirmed the injunction brought to stop
Snepp from further publication without approval of the CIA.
In applying the first amendment to actions taken by the judicial
and executive branches, the Supreme Court has followed a flexible
rather than absolutist approach. All communications, merely be-
cause they are spoken or written, are not protected. In the case of
Roth v. United States,60 Justice Brennan wrote that the first
amendment did not preclude the Court from deciding that libelous
utterances were not protected. Threats and bribes are also not pro-
tected simply because they are spoken or written.
55. Id. at 1370.
56. 456 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. Va. 1978), modified, 595 F.2d 126 (4th Cir. 1979), modified,
444 U.S. 507 (1980).
57. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 507 (1980).
58. Id. at 515-16.
59. 444 U.S. at 509.
60. 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957).
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V. CONCLUSION
In examining the cases addressing national security and the first
amendment, we learn there are no absolutes. The litigation of the
legal issues involved in these cases may provide guidance on per-
missible conduct by both the government and the press but do not
necessarily dictate public policy. In the case of media access to
Grenada in 1983, the legal issues are clear. This does not, however,
preclude the Department of Defense from exploring other methods
of working with the press to maximize the press coverage of mili-
tary operations when feasible. Following the successful completion
of the Grenada operation, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff established a panel on media-military relations. One of the
issues addressed by the panel was access to military operations.
The panel's inquiry was not based on any examination of first
amendment rights.
The panel recommended that the United States media should
cover United States military operations to the maximum degree
possible consistent with mission security and the safety of United
States forces.6 1 The panel recognized that media pooling may be
the only feasible way to provide press coverage in certain types of
military operations and the Department of Defense should attempt
to provide for the largest possible press pool. The panel also con-
cluded that public affairs planning should be conducted concur-
rently with operational planning.6 2
Following issuance of the panel's report, members of the news
media and the Secretary of Defense have held periodic meetings to
discuss mutual problems, including media relations during military
operations and exercises. It is fundamental that the successful con-
duct of military operations and the maintenance of effective na-
tional defense may require secrecy. Our relationship with other
countries depends on mutual trust. Within the Department of De-
fense, commanders in the field must have the ability to develop
plans and communicate with other officials freely and in confi-
dence in combat situations. When the lives of our people in the
armed forces are at stake, this freedom should be self-evident.
61. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, SIDE PANEL REPORT.
62. Id.
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When security concerns can be met, however, cooperation with the
press, including the transportation of reporters on military opera-
tions, may be possible.
The United States Constitution historically has served our Na-
tion well because the courts have not interpreted it rigidly. Consti-
tutional questions will continue to present formidable issues as so-
ciety changes and technology advances. Resolving conflicts
between national security and constitutional liberties may continue
to be complex because of the compelling nature of the governmen-
tal interest in protecting the security of the Nation.
